Dr Brendan Walker-Munro

Late last week, the Australian Research Council quietly made an announcement that sent shockwaves through the academic community. The federal education minister, Jason Clare, blocked research funding to 13 projects “for reasons relevant to the security, defence or international relations of Australia”. This is more than double the number that have been vetoed on security grounds for any year since the research council was established in 2001. Clare didn’t issue a press release about the matter and refused to go into more detail at a press conference a few days later. This comes as Strider (an AI intelligence company) released a report showing more than 6,000 publications and collaborations between Australian researchers and institutions associated with China’s People’s Liberation Army since 2020. Much of that research focused on high-risk technologies, like drones, artificial intelligence and radar and communications systems. What is going on?

In Las Vegas last week, two people were admitted to hospital “deathly ill” after being exposed to “possible biological material, including refrigerators containing vials with unknown liquids” at a suburban home. Law enforcement quickly scrambled, taking down an illegal laboratory on the premises. But this wasn’t a meth lab. Instead, it was allegedly filled with thousands of deadly pathogens. The FBI has since opened an official investigation. It claims the Las Vegas lab is linked to another illegal lab in California that was shut down in 2023, which was investigated by US Congress. Congress found the California biolab had received millions of dollars from Chinese banks, and held more than 1,000 genetically modified mice as well as samples of diseases including HIV, malaria, COVID and even Ebola. The US is now asking how many of these labs might exist. In Australia, we can’t really answer that question either.

When we think of spies, we may go to images of people in trench coats and dark glasses, trying to steal government papers. Or someone trying to tap the phone of a senior official. The reality of course can be much more sophisticated. One emerging area of concern is how countries protect their university research from foreign interference. And how we safely do research with other countries – a vital way to ensure Australia’s work is cutting edge. This week, research security experts including myself will meet in Brussels to talk about how to conduct free and open research in the face of growing security risks around the world. What does Australia need to do to better protect its university research?

On Wednesday, Nobel laureate Brian Schmidt and economics professor Richard Holden gave a joint address to the National Press Club in Canberra. Their key message? Australia isn’t spending enough money on university research. Schmidt wants to ensure Australia can undertake research vital to our national interests.
“I look around and I am scared,” Schmidt said. “The Australian government investment in its sovereign research capability was 50% higher 15 years ago as a fraction of GDP.”
In his remarks, Holden warned, “we’ve become addicted to funding […] research capability through international student income”.
If this sounds familiar, both Schmidt and Holden have made similar calls before. And their press club presentation follows constant and repeated repeated calls from the university sector for more funds.
How much is Australia spending on research and how does this compare to other countries?

Shortly after taking office, US President Donald Trump issued executive orders banning federal funding on so-called “woke” research.
This is part of his broader ban on all diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) policies, grants and programs in the US government.
These orders are massive in scope, impacting studies as varied as stroke recovery, computing and ancient languages.
The impact in the United States so far has been dramatic. Some universities are already cutting student admissions and looking at ways to shed academic staff and researchers.
Now the ban has impacted Australian researchers who have links to US government-funded projects. The Trump Administration is asking for information on how their research fits in with US foreign and domestic policy.

Elon Musk is no stranger to news headlines. His purchase of Twitter and subsequent decision to rebrand the platform as X has seen it called “a true black mirror of the most worrying parts of human nature”. Tesla’s incredibly flawed Cybertruck remains an ongoing source of Internet jokes and memes. It has even been suggested that Musk might buy the US arm of social media giant TikTok, after TikTok lost its appeal to overturn an impending ban in the United States.

Over the weekend, Queensland University of Technology PhD student Xiaolong Zhu became national news – and not for a good reason. Zhu is a Chinese citizen, and his visa to study in Australia has been denied on the grounds of being “directly or indirectly associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”.

The story begins in October 2019, when the university offered Zhu a scholarship to undertake a PhD in robotics. His research would focus on how drones navigate in urban environments without access to GPS.

But in June 2020, Zhu was told the foreign minister had ruled him a risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, specifically missiles and rockets. That decision may be in part motivated by Zhu’s prior education at Beihang University, an institution closely aligned with China’s military and a lead developer of ballistic missiles and stealth aircraft.

Last night, ASIO boss Mike Burgess made another powerful public statement in delivering the Annual Threat Assessment for 2024. Burgess stated that ASIO has seen “terrorists and spies […] talking about sabotage, researching sabotage, sometimes conducting reconnaissance for sabotage”.

He also highlighted the increasing focus on cyber (online methods) as a way that sabotage might be conducted. He said:

ASIO is aware of one nation state conducting multiple attempts to scan critical infrastructure in Australia and other countries, targeting water, transport and energy networks.

This would seem to align with recent reports of Chinese hackers spending up to five years in US computer networks before being detected.

But what exactly is sabotage, and should we be worried?

Late last year, a PhD student named Yuekang Li was refused a study visa to enter Canada. Why? Canada’s Federal Court was concerned he could be “targeted and coerced into providing information that would be detrimental to Canada”.

Li wasn’t the only one. Earlier this month, Iranian computer engineering student Reza Jahantigh was denied a visa to study his PhD in Canada, because of his previous service in the Iranian military. Some observers have called the decisions “deeply unhelpful”, and said they risked the prospects of future international students coming to Canada.

Despite such criticisms, Canada is at the forefront of an international charge for stricter “research security” – the idea of protecting certain university courses and research programs from espionage, foreign interference and technology theft.

While countries including the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are moving swiftly to make their research more secure, Australia lags behind. And our need for research security is only set to grow.

Last week, a special Senate committee released a report on foreign interference through social media.

It makes for scary reading. In addition to widely publicised criticisms of WeChat and TikTok – social media platforms owned by Chinese companies – the committee found US-based platforms like X (formerly known as Twitter), Meta, LinkedIn and YouTube have been targeted by foreign interference campaigns.

Yet no one has been convicted for foreign interference since Australian law reforms on this were passed in 2018. So, what’s going on?