Dr Brendan Walker-Munro

In the last two decades, universities have undertaken a drastic re-engagement with their agendas of conducting of research in the national interest. Yet the historical independence of universities has been modified by geopolitics, with these institutions collaborating more frequently with arms of government (such as the military, intelligence agencies or law enforcement) on their research endeavours. Further, the commonality of research partnerships with overseas individuals and entities – crucial to the development of diversity in opinions and views – is being challenged in the face of subordination, manipulation or interference by malicious actors. In response, one of the principal features of the European Commission's package on economic security was embedding 'research security' – the practice of protecting university-led research from interference, co-option or diversion by foreign powers for reasons of national interest. Whilst the link between economic security and national security is maturing and becoming clearer, the precise forms and mechanisms by which economic security is advanced by research security remains simultaneously contested and poorly explored. One recent trend in research security protections has been the emergence of, or uptick in, the use of economic sanctions and controls to limit engagements or partnerships between universities and foreign entities. For that reason, this paper will focus on examining two specific examples of economic sanctions frameworks through the research security lens: the policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern of Canada, and the National Security and Investment Act 2021 of the United Kingdom. The paper will argue for the proper place of such economic controls typified in both regimes, as well as exploring the general utility and drawbacks associated with the use of economic sanctions and controls in the institution of research security. It will also develop several key suggestions that could be adopted by the Member States of the European Union as they begin to comply with the new requirements.

An increasingly fractured geopolitical environment is driving substantial change in the conduct of international academic research. In the European Union (EU) Member States have enacted numerous measures designed to limit or eliminate risks of espionage, foreign interference and illicit technological theft. However, these same measures are often rejected or resisted by higher education institutions, claiming they unnecessarily complicate research, stifle innovation and infringe on academic freedom. This paper seeks to examine one research security measure adopted in Germany. These Committees for Ethics
in Security-Relevant Research (in German, Kommissionen für Ethik sicherheitsrelevanter Forschung or KEF) aim to provide researchers with guidance on ‘research of concern’ and—where necessary—the imposition of any regulatory controls or safeguards to the protection of that research. This paper presents a normative defence of Germany’s model for academic self-regulation and proposes that model for other States to possibly emulate in research security.

Higher education institutions (HEIs) are no strangers to risk managementpractices; however, recent geopolitical trends have resulted in HEIs need-ing to manage risks from hostile State-sponsored intelligence actions,such as espionage, foreign interference, hacking, and intellectual propertytheft. This in turn has led to many Western nations enacting processesand procedures for ‘research security’; that is, the protection ofsecurity-sensitive research through controls such as export limitations,sanctions, visa regulations, and funding policies. However, scholarly dis-section and discussion of precisely how research security is done is dis-tinctly lacking. This article conceptualises ‘research security’ as a form ofrisk management – specifically enterprise risk management (ERM) – inthe HEI context. It aligns research security with previous scholarly con-sensus on ERM, embeds the practice of research security in an ERMlandscape, and makes a number of propositions related to the mannerof regulating the protection of sensitive research in an ERM framework.The utility of this examination is threefold. Firstly, it applies intellectualrigour to an emerging discipline that has lacked a coherent policy frame-work. Secondly, it aligns research security to the wealth of scholarly outputon ERM (and offers opportunities for future explorations). Thirdly, itembeds in research security discourse the need for a nuanced and grad-uated discussion about risk that is largely absent from existing debates.

Globally, universities are increasingly becoming the target of foreign national security actors, engaging in espionage, sabotage, foreign interference and intellectual property theft. Despite that, there has been no examination of the utilisation of counterintelligence approaches by universities to the threats they face from the subordination or manipulation of international collaboration and research partnerships. Tangentially, the concept of research security is underexplored in a global context, despite nations like Canada, the United Kingdom, United States and the European Union having introduced research security frameworks to manage risks to national security and the protection of sensitive information (particularly for places of higher education and learning). Likewise, there has been little focus on potential solutions or mitigations of the threats to national security which arise in higher education settings within the wider context of research security in the Higher Education domain. This article seeks to achieve two purposes. Firstly, to examine the current state of research security through the lens of counterintelligence studies, and to site research security within the current discourse by adopting Prunckun's grounded theory of counterintelligence. Secondly, to propose that universities will need to begin adopting and enacting counterintelligence programmes in their institutions as part of a wider institution-led move towards research security in Higher Education, while avoiding the negative drawbacks of the securitisation of academic freedoms and synergies. Failing to do so, we argue that the very spirit of academic freedom will be undermined, and the technologies and inventions which universities seek to pursue for the betterment of humanity will be diverted and subverted for nefarious or malicious purposes.

China's role in contemporary geopolitics has been much mused upon in security scholarship. Less attention has been given to soft (and often hard) power in exercises of extraterritorial legal authority, and to the global mobility this lends a state's legal architecture. Many states the world over exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction for a plethora of reasons: legal obligation, moral obligation and the practical realities of cross-border crime, but also advancing unilateral foreign policy. China is not alone in doing so. However, to understand China's place in geopolitics, we should also understand this important aspect of its legal system. The first part of this article introduces China's approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction. The second part considers the politics of intellectual property rights as an example of expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction.

The performance of scientific and technological research has always been done openly, collaboratively and with the widest scope of international cooperation. However, recent moves by autocratic nations to exploit the standards of openness displayed by Western universities and research institutions has fuelled the emergence of ‘research security’, a domain invoking the protection of sensitive, classified or economically valuable knowledge and technologies from espionage, theft, interference and illicit transfers. Australia — once considered a ‘first mover’ by criminalising foreign interference and university espionage in 2018 — has since languished in legal and policy restrictions on research security. In some part, this is due to an unwillingness by academia to recognise that national security threats to the research enterprise are real. Therefore, this paper seeks to empirically examine live cases of research incidents from Australian institutions obtained from Freedom of Information requests. Building on those case studies, the paper then seeks to argue that Australian (and indeed global) academia is still a fundamental target for foreign adversaries seeking to expand or mature their technological and industrial bases through illicit means.

The development of quantum technologies has been labelled the next revolution in human scientific and industrial endeavour. Because quantum technologies have potential military, defence, intelligence and law enforcement applications, there has been a great deal written about quantum as a dual-use technology; however, most of the research on quantum technologies is performed in higher education environments that lack robust security cultures. This theoretical paper generates a basic overview of the impact that quantum technologies are having, and could have, on how technologies are secured in university and higher education settings (" research security "). This paper then analyses the implications of quantum technology from the perspective of research security, arguing that a new paradigm is needed that moves beyond the dual-use binary. Specific applications of quantum technology are used as examples of challenges to the definitions and explanations of dual-use, and several alternatives are proposed and summarised.

Australia, as an open market economy and democracy, is both dependent and reliant on the internet and online security for its prosperity, way of life and the functioning of our democracy. Cybersecurity, as a prerequisite for ever-increasing interconnectivity, is under assault from cyber-attacks and malicious cyberactivity being conducted by states and ‘hybrid actors’, such as cybercriminals and syndicates.

Cyber-attacks pose a serious threat to the security and integrity of entities, especially when they involve trusted insiders who have access to sensitive data and systems. To counter this threat, this paper proposes that use of active cyber defence (ACD) – such as fake files and credentials that alert the security team when accessed by unauthorised users or tracking devices that report the network activity and location of genuine trading information – can deter and detect malicious actors, often more efficiently and effectively than other methods alone.

In the last 20 years, Australia has passed national security legislation on an unprecedented scale. Since the terror attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, Australia has passed significant amounts of legislation criminalising and regulating offences of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, foreign interference, spying and bribery of Commonwealth officials. Despite the many amendments to Australia's statute books, there appear a lack of academic scrutiny as to exactly what national security "is". This article intends to trace the evolution of non-justiciability of national security over time and to demonstrate that, even despite a substantial increase in national security legislation since 11 September 2001, Australian courts have begun to unpick the historically broad cloak of non-justiciability of those matters. By demonstrating that national security is no longer entirely non-justiciable, and identifying how the contours which seemingly still forms its core have changed over time, this article contributes to the broader discourse and discussion regarding the evolving nature of national security legislation.

Research security is the action of protecting sensitive, classified or commercially valuable knowledge and technologies from espionage, theft, interference and illicit transfers. Yet academic explorations of research security are still at their most formative stages. This is especially the case in Australia and its universities, which has been accused in recent years of falling behind research security efforts compared to other Western nations such as the United States (‘US’), Canada, the United Kingdom and the European Union (‘EU’). This article has two purposes. The first is to highlight the important role that the Australian Research Council (‘ARC’) has played in providing Australian research security. The second purpose of this paper is to illustrate the significant undeveloped potential for the ARC. Drawing on examples from the funding bodies in the US and Canada (including recent changes to their enabling statutes and regulations), this article argues for an increased role for the ARC in securing the university research enterprise.