Dr Brendan Walker-Munro

The development and diffusion of new technologies into society requires technology assessment (TA) for their diverse social, political, ethical, legal, environmental and economic impacts. Using Australia and India as case studies on the diffusion of critical emerging technologies, we find that the broad "critical technology" framing adopted by both governments offers no clear direction as to methodologies for conducting technology impact assessment (TIA) of specific technologies or their strategic impacts, and that it frequently conflates peace and stability objectives with economic and industrial policy goals. Currently, there are no best practices for TIA that articulate a defined approach and methodology among scholars or officials. This ambiguity stems from the fact that TIA can be used for many different purposes while focusing on the concerns of different groups of stakeholders. Since 2022, several stakeholders, inclusive of leading intergovernmental organizations, think tanks and specialists, have called for increased attention to TIA and more disciplined approaches, particularly emphasizing effective stakeholder engagement, and consistently ethical, democratic and transparent processes. This paper defines TIA for peace and stability, defines critical emerging technologies, and identifies key dimensions of technology impact assessment together with proposed benchmarks across three tiers of practice: basic, intermediate and advanced. Drawing on nuclear-safety case studies from Australia (nuclear-powered warship visits and AUKUS submarine safety) and India (civil nuclear cybersecurity), together with a comparative analysis of the two countries' practices, the paper finds that TIA for peace and stability is consistently a lower priority than TIA for national defense or domestic security, and that neither country has a standing mechanism for conducting it to a high standard. The paper proposes a hybrid model for balancing transparency and legitimate secrecy in future assessments and sets out options for locating a dedicated institutional home for TIA- drawing on parliamentary, statutory authority and national academy models- in support of peace and stability studies between one or more nation states, toward multi-stakeholder joint impact assessment.

In this article, we discuss the emerging prominence of ‘strategic lawsuits against public participation’ (SLAPPs) across Europe and the United Kingdom as mechanisms for chilling academic discourse, particularly around topics considered unpalatable to foreign governments. We argue that the increased prominence of SLAPPs foreshadows a new form of abuse of legal process against universities that attempt to protect their researchers: vexatious or malicious complaints of research misconduct against academics and universities, using what we term here as ‘strategic complaints against researchers’ (SCAR). Identifying the possibility of SCARs as an emergent form of procedural abuse will assist universities in formulating policies and practices that separate legitimate grievances from acts of foreign interference. Together with government, funding agencies and industry partners, the higher education sector should take the lead in focusing research misconduct standards on identifying, triaging, and (where necessary) eliminating abuses of the research misconduct system aimed at chilling academic inquiry.

Where this will end? In the Abyss, one may prophecy; whither all Delusions are, at all moments, travelling; where this Delusion has now arrived. For if there be a Faith, from of old, it is this, as we often repeat, that no Lie can live for ever.--Thomas Carlyle (1837)

Facial recognition technologies (FRTs) are commonly used inAustralia in an under-regulated environment. Only two regulatorymechanisms currently direct FRT use – industry self-regulationand Australia’s privacy laws. Currently, best practices for FRTdevelopment and adoption are a key governance mechanism,including the recent guide to FRT privacy risks evaluationpublished by the Office of the Australian InformationCommissioner in 2024. Transparency is lauded as one of the keyprinciples for implementation, yet it can be an elusive bestpractice to operationalize. Transparency spans everything fromtechnical design decisions and data governance to real-worldapplications, user communication, and regulatory compliance.Thus, our research critically considers the concept of transparencyin FRT governance by asking: What does transparency as bestpractice mean in the development and implementation of facialrecognition systems? This study sought to map multi-stakeholderviewpoints through problem-centered interviews (n = 30) withexpert technical, policy, and academic stakeholders making andinforming FRT policy in Australia. Based on their responses, wedevelop a typology of what transparency means in the context ofoperationalizing algorithmic surveillance technology governance,specifically FRTs. Our findings adopt a socio-technical perspectiveand identify five distinct modes of transparency in FRTs, includingtechnical, functional, procedural, public and contextual transparency.

Military technologies have always been critical tools in shaping how nation-States interact. Given this, the enactment of export controls hasplayed a fundamental role in the development of geopolitical blocs around the world. Recently,experts have observed a rise in “Frankenstein” weapons, i.e., military technologies reassembled from export-controlled subcomponents, which are available from multiple foreign suppliers. This paper argues that the core contributor to the increase in the creation of Frankenstein weapons has been nation-States favouring unilateralism over multilateralism in enacting their export control laws. This nationalistic approach by numerous (but especially Western) nation-States has created regulatory gaps, in which private players can more readily subvert the policy reasoning for global export control. We identify that Frankenstein weapons are an emerging norm in the current geopolitical context, and we analyse the predominant causes for that emergence, suggesting a need for drastic reframing of export control policy worldwide.

In the last two decades, universities have undertaken a drastic re-engagement with their agendas of conducting of research in the national interest. Yet the historical independence of universities has been modified by geopolitics, with these institutions collaborating more frequently with arms of government (such as the military, intelligence agencies or law enforcement) on their research endeavours. Further, the commonality of research partnerships with overseas individuals and entities – crucial to the development of diversity in opinions and views – is being challenged in the face of subordination, manipulation or interference by malicious actors. In response, one of the principal features of the European Commission's package on economic security was embedding 'research security' – the practice of protecting university-led research from interference, co-option or diversion by foreign powers for reasons of national interest. Whilst the link between economic security and national security is maturing and becoming clearer, the precise forms and mechanisms by which economic security is advanced by research security remains simultaneously contested and poorly explored. One recent trend in research security protections has been the emergence of, or uptick in, the use of economic sanctions and controls to limit engagements or partnerships between universities and foreign entities. For that reason, this paper will focus on examining two specific examples of economic sanctions frameworks through the research security lens: the policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern of Canada, and the National Security and Investment Act 2021 of the United Kingdom. The paper will argue for the proper place of such economic controls typified in both regimes, as well as exploring the general utility and drawbacks associated with the use of economic sanctions and controls in the institution of research security. It will also develop several key suggestions that could be adopted by the Member States of the European Union as they begin to comply with the new requirements.

An increasingly fractured geopolitical environment is driving substantial change in the conduct of international academic research. In the European Union (EU) Member States have enacted numerous measures designed to limit or eliminate risks of espionage, foreign interference and illicit technological theft. However, these same measures are often rejected or resisted by higher education institutions, claiming they unnecessarily complicate research, stifle innovation and infringe on academic freedom. This paper seeks to examine one research security measure adopted in Germany. These Committees for Ethics
in Security-Relevant Research (in German, Kommissionen für Ethik sicherheitsrelevanter Forschung or KEF) aim to provide researchers with guidance on ‘research of concern’ and—where necessary—the imposition of any regulatory controls or safeguards to the protection of that research. This paper presents a normative defence of Germany’s model for academic self-regulation and proposes that model for other States to possibly emulate in research security.

Higher education institutions (HEIs) are no strangers to risk managementpractices; however, recent geopolitical trends have resulted in HEIs need-ing to manage risks from hostile State-sponsored intelligence actions,such as espionage, foreign interference, hacking, and intellectual propertytheft. This in turn has led to many Western nations enacting processesand procedures for ‘research security’; that is, the protection ofsecurity-sensitive research through controls such as export limitations,sanctions, visa regulations, and funding policies. However, scholarly dis-section and discussion of precisely how research security is done is dis-tinctly lacking. This article conceptualises ‘research security’ as a form ofrisk management – specifically enterprise risk management (ERM) – inthe HEI context. It aligns research security with previous scholarly con-sensus on ERM, embeds the practice of research security in an ERMlandscape, and makes a number of propositions related to the mannerof regulating the protection of sensitive research in an ERM framework.The utility of this examination is threefold. Firstly, it applies intellectualrigour to an emerging discipline that has lacked a coherent policy frame-work. Secondly, it aligns research security to the wealth of scholarly outputon ERM (and offers opportunities for future explorations). Thirdly, itembeds in research security discourse the need for a nuanced and grad-uated discussion about risk that is largely absent from existing debates.

Globally, universities are increasingly becoming the target of foreign national security actors, engaging in espionage, sabotage, foreign interference and intellectual property theft. Despite that, there has been no examination of the utilisation of counterintelligence approaches by universities to the threats they face from the subordination or manipulation of international collaboration and research partnerships. Tangentially, the concept of research security is underexplored in a global context, despite nations like Canada, the United Kingdom, United States and the European Union having introduced research security frameworks to manage risks to national security and the protection of sensitive information (particularly for places of higher education and learning). Likewise, there has been little focus on potential solutions or mitigations of the threats to national security which arise in higher education settings within the wider context of research security in the Higher Education domain. This article seeks to achieve two purposes. Firstly, to examine the current state of research security through the lens of counterintelligence studies, and to site research security within the current discourse by adopting Prunckun's grounded theory of counterintelligence. Secondly, to propose that universities will need to begin adopting and enacting counterintelligence programmes in their institutions as part of a wider institution-led move towards research security in Higher Education, while avoiding the negative drawbacks of the securitisation of academic freedoms and synergies. Failing to do so, we argue that the very spirit of academic freedom will be undermined, and the technologies and inventions which universities seek to pursue for the betterment of humanity will be diverted and subverted for nefarious or malicious purposes.

China's role in contemporary geopolitics has been much mused upon in security scholarship. Less attention has been given to soft (and often hard) power in exercises of extraterritorial legal authority, and to the global mobility this lends a state's legal architecture. Many states the world over exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction for a plethora of reasons: legal obligation, moral obligation and the practical realities of cross-border crime, but also advancing unilateral foreign policy. China is not alone in doing so. However, to understand China's place in geopolitics, we should also understand this important aspect of its legal system. The first part of this article introduces China's approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction. The second part considers the politics of intellectual property rights as an example of expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction.

The performance of scientific and technological research has always been done openly, collaboratively and with the widest scope of international cooperation. However, recent moves by autocratic nations to exploit the standards of openness displayed by Western universities and research institutions has fuelled the emergence of ‘research security’, a domain invoking the protection of sensitive, classified or economically valuable knowledge and technologies from espionage, theft, interference and illicit transfers. Australia — once considered a ‘first mover’ by criminalising foreign interference and university espionage in 2018 — has since languished in legal and policy restrictions on research security. In some part, this is due to an unwillingness by academia to recognise that national security threats to the research enterprise are real. Therefore, this paper seeks to empirically examine live cases of research incidents from Australian institutions obtained from Freedom of Information requests. Building on those case studies, the paper then seeks to argue that Australian (and indeed global) academia is still a fundamental target for foreign adversaries seeking to expand or mature their technological and industrial bases through illicit means.