Dr Brendan Walker-Munro

When considering new forms of technological innovation, they are often given varying labels such as “emerging”, “disruptive”, or “critical”. However, nowhere is the literature more divided on the parameters of technological inclusion than in the field of “dual-use” technologies. Conceptually, dual-use technologies have a dichotomous characteristic: they can used for civilian purpose as well as in defence or military applications. But where do the boundaries lie? For example, are law enforcement, surveillance or espionage uses of new technologies deemed “civilian” or “military” in nature? Further, the labelling of a technology as “dual-use” is incredibly significant – it can trigger classification of research data or the imposition of export controls, making collaborative efforts and publications on that technology more difficult as researchers navigate a torturous process of governmental encroachment, licensing, and regulation. This paper proposes a radical shift in innovation policy: discarding dual-use as a label of technology. Instead, it proposes a more nuanced framework which encourages more granular discussions about the potential national and economic security implications of a given technological development. The paper goes on to argue for the analytical and empirical value of that framework through application in contextual case studies derived from classification and export control cases globally. This paper therefore frames dual-use as an unhelpful metaphor in technology policy and encourages the literature and industry of research move to a more helpful framework for discussing new technologies.

The development and diffusion of new technologies into society requires technology assessment (TA) for their diverse social, political, ethical, legal, environmental and economic impacts. Using Australia and India as case studies on the diffusion of critical emerging technologies, we find that the broad "critical technology" framing adopted by both governments offers no clear direction as to methodologies for conducting technology impact assessment (TIA) of specific technologies or their strategic impacts, and that it frequently conflates peace and stability objectives with economic and industrial policy goals. Currently, there are no best practices for TIA that articulate a defined approach and methodology among scholars or officials. This ambiguity stems from the fact that TIA can be used for many different purposes while focusing on the concerns of different groups of stakeholders. Since 2022, several stakeholders, inclusive of leading intergovernmental organizations, think tanks and specialists, have called for increased attention to TIA and more disciplined approaches, particularly emphasizing effective stakeholder engagement, and consistently ethical, democratic and transparent processes. This paper defines TIA for peace and stability, defines critical emerging technologies, and identifies key dimensions of technology impact assessment together with proposed benchmarks across three tiers of practice: basic, intermediate and advanced. Drawing on nuclear-safety case studies from Australia (nuclear-powered warship visits and AUKUS submarine safety) and India (civil nuclear cybersecurity), together with a comparative analysis of the two countries' practices, the paper finds that TIA for peace and stability is consistently a lower priority than TIA for national defense or domestic security, and that neither country has a standing mechanism for conducting it to a high standard. The paper proposes a hybrid model for balancing transparency and legitimate secrecy in future assessments and sets out options for locating a dedicated institutional home for TIA- drawing on parliamentary, statutory authority and national academy models- in support of peace and stability studies between one or more nation states, toward multi-stakeholder joint impact assessment.

In this article, we discuss the emerging prominence of ‘strategic lawsuits against public participation’ (SLAPPs) across Europe and the United Kingdom as mechanisms for chilling academic discourse, particularly around topics considered unpalatable to foreign governments. We argue that the increased prominence of SLAPPs foreshadows a new form of abuse of legal process against universities that attempt to protect their researchers: vexatious or malicious complaints of research misconduct against academics and universities, using what we term here as ‘strategic complaints against researchers’ (SCAR). Identifying the possibility of SCARs as an emergent form of procedural abuse will assist universities in formulating policies and practices that separate legitimate grievances from acts of foreign interference. Together with government, funding agencies and industry partners, the higher education sector should take the lead in focusing research misconduct standards on identifying, triaging, and (where necessary) eliminating abuses of the research misconduct system aimed at chilling academic inquiry.

Where this will end? In the Abyss, one may prophecy; whither all Delusions are, at all moments, travelling; where this Delusion has now arrived. For if there be a Faith, from of old, it is this, as we often repeat, that no Lie can live for ever.--Thomas Carlyle (1837)

Facial recognition technologies (FRTs) are commonly used inAustralia in an under-regulated environment. Only two regulatorymechanisms currently direct FRT use – industry self-regulationand Australia’s privacy laws. Currently, best practices for FRTdevelopment and adoption are a key governance mechanism,including the recent guide to FRT privacy risks evaluationpublished by the Office of the Australian InformationCommissioner in 2024. Transparency is lauded as one of the keyprinciples for implementation, yet it can be an elusive bestpractice to operationalize. Transparency spans everything fromtechnical design decisions and data governance to real-worldapplications, user communication, and regulatory compliance.Thus, our research critically considers the concept of transparencyin FRT governance by asking: What does transparency as bestpractice mean in the development and implementation of facialrecognition systems? This study sought to map multi-stakeholderviewpoints through problem-centered interviews (n = 30) withexpert technical, policy, and academic stakeholders making andinforming FRT policy in Australia. Based on their responses, wedevelop a typology of what transparency means in the context ofoperationalizing algorithmic surveillance technology governance,specifically FRTs. Our findings adopt a socio-technical perspectiveand identify five distinct modes of transparency in FRTs, includingtechnical, functional, procedural, public and contextual transparency.

Military technologies have always been critical tools in shaping how nation-States interact. Given this, the enactment of export controls hasplayed a fundamental role in the development of geopolitical blocs around the world. Recently,experts have observed a rise in “Frankenstein” weapons, i.e., military technologies reassembled from export-controlled subcomponents, which are available from multiple foreign suppliers. This paper argues that the core contributor to the increase in the creation of Frankenstein weapons has been nation-States favouring unilateralism over multilateralism in enacting their export control laws. This nationalistic approach by numerous (but especially Western) nation-States has created regulatory gaps, in which private players can more readily subvert the policy reasoning for global export control. We identify that Frankenstein weapons are an emerging norm in the current geopolitical context, and we analyse the predominant causes for that emergence, suggesting a need for drastic reframing of export control policy worldwide.

Several weeks ago, Jason Clare took a step that every federal ­education minister for the past 20 years has been lambasted for doing: he used his ministerial veto to block funding to 13 grant applications made to the Australian Research Council. Unlike previous vetoes, this wasn’t about pork-barrelling or political pointscoring, it was for “reasons relevant to the security, defence or international relations of Australia”. Making decisions such as this to protect our universities and our academics is called “research security”, and it’s supposed to keep our campuses and research programs – most of them funded with your tax dollars – free from threats such as espionage, foreign interference, hackers and technology theft. Strangely, the higher education sector, usually championed by the Group of Eight or Universities Australia, has been deathly quiet about the minister’s decision. That’s despite claiming for years that foreign interference is overblown and just more red tape for a sector already drowning in it. In fact, if you look for the words “research security” in any government or university policy in this country, you won’t find it. Research security in Australia is a bit like Fight Club: the first rule seems to be that we don’t talk about it. So an Australian research security failure has been on the cards for years. We’ve just been missing the warning signs.

In the last two decades, universities have undertaken a drastic re-engagement with their agendas of conducting of research in the national interest. Yet the historical independence of universities has been modified by geopolitics, with these institutions collaborating more frequently with arms of government (such as the military, intelligence agencies or law enforcement) on their research endeavours. Further, the commonality of research partnerships with overseas individuals and entities – crucial to the development of diversity in opinions and views – is being challenged in the face of subordination, manipulation or interference by malicious actors. In response, one of the principal features of the European Commission's package on economic security was embedding 'research security' – the practice of protecting university-led research from interference, co-option or diversion by foreign powers for reasons of national interest. Whilst the link between economic security and national security is maturing and becoming clearer, the precise forms and mechanisms by which economic security is advanced by research security remains simultaneously contested and poorly explored. One recent trend in research security protections has been the emergence of, or uptick in, the use of economic sanctions and controls to limit engagements or partnerships between universities and foreign entities. For that reason, this paper will focus on examining two specific examples of economic sanctions frameworks through the research security lens: the policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern of Canada, and the National Security and Investment Act 2021 of the United Kingdom. The paper will argue for the proper place of such economic controls typified in both regimes, as well as exploring the general utility and drawbacks associated with the use of economic sanctions and controls in the institution of research security. It will also develop several key suggestions that could be adopted by the Member States of the European Union as they begin to comply with the new requirements.

Late last week, the Australian Research Council quietly made an announcement that sent shockwaves through the academic community. The federal education minister, Jason Clare, blocked research funding to 13 projects “for reasons relevant to the security, defence or international relations of Australia”. This is more than double the number that have been vetoed on security grounds for any year since the research council was established in 2001. Clare didn’t issue a press release about the matter and refused to go into more detail at a press conference a few days later. This comes as Strider (an AI intelligence company) released a report showing more than 6,000 publications and collaborations between Australian researchers and institutions associated with China’s People’s Liberation Army since 2020. Much of that research focused on high-risk technologies, like drones, artificial intelligence and radar and communications systems. What is going on?

Since the enactment of the AUKUS Arrangement in 2021, the proponents of AUKUS – the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Australia – have been undertaking a drastic re-engagement with their agendas of conducting of research in the national interest. Yet the historical independence of many research institutions has been modified by geopolitics, with these institutions collaborating more or less frequently with arms of government depending on concerns of national security. Further, the commonality of research partnerships with overseas individuals and entities – still absolutely crucial to the development of diversity in opinions and views – is being challenged in the face of subordination, manipulation or interference by malicious actors.

AUKUS has thus seen the evolution and expansion of legal controls into the domains of higher education research: foreign investment reviews, sanctions and export controls, and visa restrictions on overseas students and professors. This practice of “research security” has gained significant traction across a number of jurisdictions over the last decade as a measure of securitizing university research against national security threats. The language of these controls largely reflects the emergence of geopolitics as an existential threat: according to the policy basis of those controls imposed by States, universities are no longer safe to engage in the frank, open and collaborative inquiry that has personified their existence for centuries.
One recent trend has been the emergence of, or uptick in, the use of economic sanctions and controls to limit engagements or partnerships between universities and foreign entities on research security grounds. However, the precise contours of what constitutes appropriate and responsible research security controls in the higher education environment remain simultaneously contested and poorly explored.

This paper will thus focus on examining the current research security regimes of the US, UK and Australia, with particular emphasis on the use of national security and economic controls to shape collaborations in high-tech research. The paper will argue for the proper place of such controls typified in regimes of law and policy, as well as exploring the utility and drawbacks associated with the use of law versus policy in the institution of research security controls. It will also develop several key lessons that could be learned by other jurisdictions as they confront the shifting dynamic of global economic competition.

An increasingly fractured geopolitical environment is driving substantial change in the conduct of international academic research. In the European Union (EU) Member States have enacted numerous measures designed to limit or eliminate risks of espionage, foreign interference and illicit technological theft. However, these same measures are often rejected or resisted by higher education institutions, claiming they unnecessarily complicate research, stifle innovation and infringe on academic freedom. This paper seeks to examine one research security measure adopted in Germany. These Committees for Ethics
in Security-Relevant Research (in German, Kommissionen für Ethik sicherheitsrelevanter Forschung or KEF) aim to provide researchers with guidance on ‘research of concern’ and—where necessary—the imposition of any regulatory controls or safeguards to the protection of that research. This paper presents a normative defence of Germany’s model for academic self-regulation and proposes that model for other States to possibly emulate in research security.