Journal article
The guilty (silicon) mind: Blameworthiness and liability in human-machine teaming
Cambridge Law Review, Vol.8(1), pp.1-24
27/03/2023
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Abstract
As science pushes the boundaries of the development of artificial intelligence (AI), the progress has caused scholars and policymakers alike to question the legality of utilising AI in various human endeavours. Debate has raged in international scholarship about the legitimacy of applying AI to weapon systems to form lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). Yet the legality of applying or utilising AI is questionable even when AI is applied to a non-weaponised autonomous system: how does one hold a machine accountable for a crime? What about a tort? Can an artificial agent understand the moral and ethical content of its instructions? These are thorny questions, and in many cases, these questions have been answered in the negative, as artificial entities lack any contingent moral agency. What then occurs if the AI is not alone, but linked with or overseen by a human being, with their own moral and ethical understandings and obligations? Who is responsible for any malfeasance that may be committed? Does the human bear the legal risks of unethical or immoral decisions of an AI? These are some of the questions with which this manuscript seeks to engage.
Details
- Title
- The guilty (silicon) mind: Blameworthiness and liability in human-machine teaming
- Creators
- Brendan Walker-Munro - University of QueenslandZena Assaad - Australian National University
- Publication Details
- Cambridge Law Review, Vol.8(1), pp.1-24
- Publisher
- Cambridge Law Review
- Identifiers
- 991013167312802368
- Academic Unit
- Faculty of Business, Law and Arts
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article