Nietzsche’s aspiration to “have and not have one’s emotions” seems an impossible one. However, Nietzsche believes that it is possible because of his special understanding of the nature of the emotions and their relationship to the self. He views emotions as central to how individuals understand and situate themselves in the world. He assigns a vital role to emotions in his account of the formation of the self through the interpretation of bodily sensations, a view that sees emotions as both a tool and effect of social forces. As a consequence, he neither advocates a suppression of emotions nor a blind following of them. Rather he suggests that they should be acknowledged, investigated and ordered in a process that develops a focused emotional engagement while cultivating a capacity to experience a broad range of emotions. This understanding of emotions enables us to recognise their cognitive, affective and social dimensions, contributing to our ability to critically engage with emotional experience.
Journal article
Interpreting feeling: Nietzsche on the emotions and the self
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy, Vol.13, pp.1-27
2009
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Abstract
Details
- Title
- Interpreting feeling: Nietzsche on the emotions and the self
- Creators
- Erika Kerruish - Southern Cross University
- Publication Details
- Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy, Vol.13, pp.1-27
- Identifiers
- 1457; 991012822027202368
- Academic Unit
- School of Arts and Social Sciences; Faculty of Business, Law and Arts; Humanities
- Resource Type
- Journal article