Conference proceeding
SigA: rPPG-based Authentication for Virtual Reality Head-mounted Display
RAID '23: Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, pp.686-699
ACM Other Conferences
The 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID 2023) (Hong Kong China, 16/10/2023–18/10/2023)
16/10/2023
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Abstract
Consumer-grade virtual reality head-mounted displays (VR-HMD) are becoming increasingly popular. Despite VR’s convenience and booming applications, VR-based authentication schemes are underdeveloped. The recently proposed authentication methods (Electrooculogram based, Electrical Muscle Stimulation-based, and alike) require active user involvement, disturbing many scenarios like drone flight and telemedicine. This paper proposes an effective and efficient user authentication method in VR environments resilient to impersonation attacks using physiological signals — Photoplethysmogram (PPG), namely SigA. SigA exploits the advantage that PPG is a physiological signal invisible to the naked eye. Using VR-HMDs to cover the eye area completely, SigA reduces the risk of signal leakage during PPG acquisition. We conducted a comprehensive analysis of SigA’s feasibility on five publicly available datasets, nine different pre-trained models, three facial regions, various lengths of the video clips required for training, four different signal time intervals, and continuous authentication with different sliding window sizes. The results demonstrate that SigA achieves more than 95% of the average F1-score in a one-second signal to accommodate a complete cardiac cycle for most adults, implying its applicability in real-world scenarios. Furthermore, experiments have shown that SigA is resistant to zero-effort attacks, statistical attacks, impersonation attacks (with a detection accuracy of over 95%) and session hijacking attacks.
Details
- Title
- SigA: rPPG-based Authentication for Virtual Reality Head-mounted Display
- Creators
- Lin Li - Swinburne University of TechnologyChao Chen - RMIT UniversityLei Pan - Deakin UniversityLeo Yu Zhang - Griffith UniversityJun Zhang - Swinburne University of TechnologyYang Xiang - Swinburne University of Technology
- Publication Details
- RAID '23: Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, pp.686-699
- Conference
- The 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID 2023) (Hong Kong China, 16/10/2023–18/10/2023)
- Series
- ACM Other Conferences
- Publisher
- ACM; New York, NY
- Number of pages
- 14
- Identifiers
- 9798400707650; 991013225624502368
- Copyright
- © 2023 by the Association for Computing Machinery, Inc.
- Academic Unit
- Faculty of Science and Engineering
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Conference proceeding