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Technology threatening biosecurity: the problem of ‘dual-use’ definitions in the age of AI and synthetic biology
Book chapter

Technology threatening biosecurity: the problem of ‘dual-use’ definitions in the age of AI and synthetic biology

Brendan Walker-Munro
Prohibited Chemical and Biological Weapons and the Law: Legal Responses to Lethal Innovation, pp.137-167
Routledge, 1st
2026
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003674436-7

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Abstract

The use of generative artificial intelligence platforms has been widely embraced in the biological and life sciences. Use of large language models and machine learning programs is emerging as a prominent method for replacing hours of iterative analysis or 'grunt work' usually performed by laboratory assistants or early-career researchers. However, there remains a 'dark side' to the use of these platforms, such as the development of novel biological or chemical warfare agents that have artificial characteristics not found in nature, or that enable a pathogen to bypass traditional protective measures. This chapter has two purposes. First, it examines the evolution of common domestic legal responses to biological weapons and their precursor research flowing from the Geneva Gas Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention, with a particular focus on examining the 'dual use' dichotomy inherent in such responses. The chapter will then progress to examining the challenges, risks, and opportunities facing these types of legal responses in the face of emerging, critical, and disruptive technologies, especially generative artificial intelligence and synthetic biology. Some recommendations for more targeted governmental intervention (both internationally and domestically in many Western nations) will be proposed before concluding.

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